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Abstract. This paper introduces a spatialized variation of the Connections model of Jackson
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11. Introduction
There is an increasing consensus in the economic literature to recognize that network struc-
tures signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the outcomes of many social and economics activities. In the mean-
time, networks are often strategically shaped by the participating agents in a game theoretic
fashion (Jackson and Wolinski, 1996; Bala and Goyal, 2000). The growing interest for net-
work formation appears in the recent surge of models encompassing various contexts such as
job-contact networks (Calvó-Armengol, 2003), oligopolies and R&D collaborations (Goyal and
Moraga, 2001; Goyal and Joshi, 2003), buyer-seller networks (Kranton and Minehart, 2000),
innovation networks (Carayol and Roux, 2003), etc1.
This literature has not yet dedicated much attention to the full characterization of the
endogenous networks and most importantly to the conditions that may lead to the emergence
of more complex and realistic networks. Indeed, the networks observed and discussed in most
models are much too regular as compared to real social and economic networks which have been
extensively explored and characterized in Sociology and Physics. It has been shown that the
average distance between any two agents2 in most social networks is remarkably short while
agents remain highly clustered3,4. Networks that share these two structural properties are said
to be small worlds à la Watts and Strogatz (1998).
In this paper, we show that the strategic approach to network formation can lead to the
emergence of networks that share such structural properties. Our larger aim is to understand
which economic conditions of network formation are consistent with the emergence of such
networks5. For these purposes, we introduce a strategic model of network formation built on a
simple variation of the connections model of Jackson and Wolinski (1996). Myopic self-interested
agents beneﬁt from other agents with whom they are directly or indirectly connected in a com-
munication network. The longer the distance in the network the weaker the spillover. Moreover,
we consider that agents bear costs for direct connections which are linearly increasing with
geographic distance in a similar fashion than Johnson and Gilles (2000) who refer to a linear
world while our agents are arranged on a circle. With this simple speciﬁcation, we obtain in a
dynamic setting (close to the one developed in Jackson and Watts, 2002) and for a wide range
of parameters values, endogenous pairwise stable networks which exhibit both high local cluste-
ring and some distant connections. We demonstrate that these networks have the small worlds
characteristics.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents basic formal deﬁnitions. Section 3 is
1For a survey of models of network formation, refer to Jackson (2004).
2The distance between two agents is computed as the minimal number of inter-individual connections between
them.
3Such properties have for instance been evidenced on web sites links or coauthorship of scientiﬁc papers (e.g.
Albert and Barabási, 1999; Newman, 2001).
4Most real networks also share some other structural properties such as skew degree distribution or short
diameter (Albert et Barabási, 1999, 2002).
5This aim is shared by several previous papers : Carayol and Roux (2003), Galeotti, Goyal, and Kamphorst
(2004) and Jackson and Rogers (2005).
2devoted to the static features of the model and to the presentation of analytical results on
pairwise stability and eﬃciency. In Section 4 we introduce the dynamic stochastic process and
the results obtained in this framework. The proofs are deferred to Section 5.
2. Basic notions
2.1. Graphs
Consider a ﬁnite set of n agents, N = {1,2,...,n} with n ≥ 3, and let i and j be two
members of this set. Agents are represented by the nodes of a non-directed graph the edges of
which represent the links between them. The graph constitutes the relational network between
the agents. A link between two distinct agents i and j ∈ N is denoted ij. A graph g is a list of
non ordered pairs of connected and distinct agents. Formally, {ij} ∈ g means that ij exists in g.
We deﬁne the complete graph gN = {ij | i,j ∈ N} as the set of all subsets of N of size 2, where
all players are connected with all the others. Let g ⊆ gN be an arbitrary collection of links on
N. We deﬁne G =
￿
g ⊆ gN￿
as the ﬁnite set of all possible graphs between the n agents.
Let g￿ = g + ij = g ∪ {ij} and g￿￿ = g − ij = g\{ij} be respectively the graph obtained by
adding ij and the one obtained by deleting ij from the existing graph g. The graphs g and g￿ are
said to be adjacent as well as the graphs g and g￿￿. For any g, we deﬁne N(g) = {i | ∃j : ij ∈ g},
the set of agents who have at least one link in the network g. We also deﬁne Ni(g) as the set of
neighbors agent i has, that is : Ni(g) = {j | ij ∈ g}. The cardinal of that set ηi(g) = #Ni(g) is
called the degree of node i. The total number of links in the graph g is η(g) = #g.
A path in a non empty graph g ∈ G connecting i to j, is a sequence of edges between distinct
agents such that {i1i2,i2i3,...,ik−1ik} ⊂ g where i1 = i, ik = j. The length of a path is the
number of edges it contains. Let i ←→g j be the set of paths connecting i and j on graph g. The
set of shortest paths between i and j on g noted i￿ ←→gj is such that if ∀k ∈ i￿ ←→gj; implies that
k ∈ i ←→ j and #k = minh∈i←→gj #h. We deﬁne the geodesic distance between two agents i
and j as the number of links of the shortest path between them : d(i,j) = dg(ij) = #k ∈ i￿ ←→gj.
When there is no path between i and j then their geodesic distance is conventionally inﬁnite :
d(i,j) = ∞.
An external metrics is also introduced, representing for example the geographic position
of agents (Johnson and Gilles, 2000). Such external metrics deﬁnes a new distance operator
denoted d￿(i,j). In our model, we consider that agents are located on a circle (or a ring).
Without loss of generality, agents are ordered according to their index, such that i is the im-
mediate geographic neighbor of agent i + 1 and agent i − 1 but agent 1 and agent n who
are neighbors. As a consequence, the geographic distance between any two agents is given by
d￿(i,j) = min{|i − j|;n − |i − j|}.
Several typical graphs can be described. Let i ￿= j ∈ N. First of all, the empty graph,
denoted g∅, is such that it does not contain any links. The ring g
◦
is a regular network of order
k = 1, in which all agents are connected and only connected with their two closest geographic
3neighbors. The chain gc, is deﬁned as a connected subset of the ring, that is gc ⊂ g◦ and
∀i,j ∈ N(gc),i ←→gc j ￿= ∅. If #gc = #g
◦
then gc = g
◦
. Let gmc be a maximally connected
chain such that #gmc = #g
◦
− 1. If gc such that #gc ≤ gmc, there is always one and only one
path between two connected agents i and j (the set i ←→gc j is a singleton). The covering chain
of the graph g is a chain gcc such that for all i,j ∈ N : i￿ ←→g
◦j ⊂ gcc iﬀ ij ∈ g. The double ring
denoted g2◦ is a regular network of order k = 2 such that all agents are only connected with
their four closest neighbors. The triple ring denoted g3◦ is a regular network of order k = 3 : All
agents are only connected with their six closest neighbors. Finally, a (complete) star, denoted
g￿, is such that #g￿ = n − 1 and there exists an agent i ∈ N such that if jk ∈ g￿, then either
j = i or k = i. Agent i is called the center of the star. It should be noted that there are n
possible stars, since every node can be the center.
2.2. Networks stability and eﬃciency
In the two-sided network formation game of Jackson and Wolinski (1996), pairs of agents meet
and decide to form, maintain or break links. The formation of a link requires the consent of both
agents but not its deletion which can emanate from one of them unilaterally. Moreover, agents
are myopic which means that they take decisions on the basis of the immediate impacts on their
current payoﬀs. Jackson and Wolinski (1996) introduce the notion of pairwise stability which
departs from the Nash equilibrium since the process of network formation is both cooperative
and non cooperative. A network is said to be pairwise stable if no incentives exist for any two
agents to form a link or for any agent to break one of his links.
Formally, let πi :
￿
g | g ⊆ gN￿
→ R, the payoﬀs received by agent i from his position in the
communication network g, with πi(∅) = 0. The deﬁnition of the pairwise stability notion follows.
Deﬁnition 1. A network g ⊆ gN is pairwise stable if :
i) for all ij ∈ g, πi(g) ≥ πi(g − ij) and πj(g) ≥ πj(g − ij), and
ii) for all ij / ∈ g, if πi(g + ij) > πi(g) then πj(g + ij) < πj(g).
As regard network eﬃciency, we use the ‘strong’ notion introduced by Jackson and Wolinski
(1996). It relies on the computation of the total value of a graph g given by : π(g) =
￿
i∈N πi (g).
A network is then said to be eﬃcient if it maximizes this sum.
Deﬁnition 2. A network g ⊆ gN is eﬃcient if it maximizes the value function π(g) on the
set of all possible graphs
￿
g | g ⊆ gN￿
i.e. π(g) ≥ π(g￿) for all g￿ ⊆ gN.
It should also be noticed that several networks can lead to the same maximal total value.
For example, if we consider strictly homogenous agents, any isomorphic graph of an eﬃcient
network is also eﬃcient.
3. The spatialized connections model
3.1. Model
The model we introduce is a variation of the so called Connections model introduced by Jack-
son and Wolinski (1996). In this model, links represent individuals’ relationships (for example,
4friendships). In such a context, agents beneﬁt from their direct and indirect connections, through
the relational network of their partners. But, the communication is not perfect : the positive
externality deteriorates with the relational distance of the connection. Formally, there is a decay
parameter which represents the quality of links used for information ﬂows. Moreover, agents
bear costs for maintaining direct connections. As a consequence, agents try to maximize the
value generated from direct and indirect connections, avoiding superﬂuous connections. This
simple speciﬁcation of the individual payoﬀs allows the authors to obtain systematic analytical
results on graphs’ eﬃciency and partial results on networks’ stability. Nevertheless, the eﬃcient
and stable network structures they discuss are very simple and somehow unrealistic (complete
network, empty network, complete star).
In order to obtain emerging networks which tend to correspond to the empirically observed
social or economic networks, we let payoﬀs depend on the geographic positions of agents on the








where d(i,j) is the geodesic distance between i and j. δ ∈ ]0;1[ is the decay parameter and
δd(i,j) gives the payoﬀs resulting from the (direct or indirect) connection between i and j. It is a
decreasing function of the geodesic distance since δ is less than unity. Notice that if there is no
path between i and j, d(i,j) = ∞ and thus δd(i,j) = 0. The second part of the right-hand side of
the equation describes the costs of direct links. d￿(i,j) gives the geographic distance between any
two agents on the external metrics (a circle) we consider. Thus the cost of a link increases linearly
with the geographic distance separating neighboring agents. Finally, the positive parameter c is
the unit costs of links formation. We thus obtain the same payoﬀs speciﬁcation as in Johnson
and Gilles (2000), but with a circle as an external metrics instead of a line.
3.2. Results
The analytical results obtained on networks eﬃciency and stability in the simple model
described in equation (1) are summed up in the following two propositions.
Proposition 1. Eﬃciency.
i) The empty network g∅ is the only eﬃcient network when c > δ +
(n−2)
4 δ2.
ii) If δ2 −δn−1 < c, the value of any acyclic graph g is less than its associated covering
chain gc.
iii) Consider three chains gc,gc￿ and gc￿￿, if gc￿ ∩ gc￿￿ = ∅ and #gc ≥ #gc￿ + #gc￿￿, then
π(gc) > π(gc￿)+π(gc￿￿). Moreover a maximal chain gmc (a chain such that #gmc = n−1) is the
most eﬃcient positive value chain.
Proposition 2. Stability.
i) When δ > c, the empty graph is never pairwise stable. When δ < c, the empty graph
g∅ is the unique acyclic pairwise stable graph and no network containing a peripheral agent (has
only one connection) is pairwise stable. The empty graph is pairwise stable when c = δ.
5ii) The star g￿ is not stable either if c ≥ 2/n and n is even, or if c ≥ 2/(n − 1) and n
is odd.
iii) Assume n is even. The ring g
◦






























i=1 δi > 0.
The pairwise stability approach leads us to results limited to the far ends of the spectrum of
parameters values.
4. Dynamic networks formation
4.1. The perturbed stochastic process of network formation
The dynamic process can be described as follows. At each time period t, two agents i and
j ∈ N are randomly selected. If the two agents are directly connected, they can jointly decide
to maintain their relation or unilaterally decide to sever the link between them. If they are not
connected, they can jointly decide to form a link or renounce unilaterally. Formally, those two
situations are the following :
i) if ij ∈ gt, the link is maintained if πi(gt) ≥ πi(gt − ij) and πj(gt) ≥ πj(gt − ij).
Otherwise, the link is deleted.
ii) if ij / ∈ gt, a new link is created if πi(gt +ij) ≥ πi(gt) and πj(gt +ij) ≥ πj(gt),with a
strict inequality for one of them.
The stochastic process introduced here can be conceptualized as a Markov process in which
the state of the system at time t (with t = 0,1,2,...) is given by the graph structure gt ∈ G. The
evolution of the system {gt,t ≥ 0} can be described as a discrete-time stochastic process with
(ﬁnite) state space G.
Following Jackson and Watts (2002), we then introduce small random perturbations ε which
invert agents’ right decisions in creating, maintaining or deleting links. These perturbations may
be understood as mistakes or as mutations. For small but non null values of ε, it can be shown
that the discrete-time Markov chain becomes irreductible and aperiodic and has thus a unique
corresponding stationary distribution (µε). Such perturbed stochastic processes are said to be
ergodic. Intuitively ergodicity implies that it is possible to transit directly or indirectly between
any chosen pair of states in a potentially very long period of time. It allows the long run state
of the system to become independent of its initial conditions.
Usually, the modeler let ε → 0 (once the long run is reached) in order to restrict the number
of states selected in the long run. State z is said to be a stochastically stable state (Young, 1993)
if it has a non null probability of occurrence in the stationary distribution : limε→0 µε(z) > 0.
In the network formation context, Jackson and Watts (2002) show that stochastically stable
networks are either pairwise stable or part of a closed cycle (of the unperturbed process). In
practice the precise computation of the stochastically stable networks requires the identiﬁcation
6of all the recurrent classes of the unperturbed process (Young, 1998) which, in the network
context, are likely to be extremely numerous. To make that point clear, think that there is a
recurrent class for each pairwise stable network and that in models such as the connections model
or the spatialized connections model presented in Section 3, possibly thousands of networks are
pairwise stable. Therefore we propose a slightly diﬀerent regime for the perturbation process.
We let the error term decrease in time according to the following simple rule :
εt =
￿
ε if t < T
1/t otherwise
, (2)
with ε > 0 the initial noise and T some ﬁnite time. This rule ensures that the noise does aﬀect
the dynamics while it decreases down to zero when time increases with limt→∞ εt = 0. It also
preserves the ergodicity property of the system. Notice that this property is interesting since it
renders numerical experiments more tractable in order to examine with good conﬁdence the long
run behavior of the system (Vega-Redondo, 2005). Therefore we use Monte Carlo experiments to
approximate the unique limiting stationary distribution (of networks) of the perturbed dynamic
process presented above. The unit costs is ﬁxed as c = 2/n as a normalization device that might
account for an inverse proportionality between the costs and the size of the network which is set
to n = 20 agents. All experiments are performed with randomly drawn values of δ over its value
space ]0,1[. The experiments are stopped at t = 10,000, date after which the process is proven
to have almost surely stabilized on a given pairwise stable state6. If not, the process still goes
until it reaches one.
4.2 Network indicators
Several indicators are used in order to provide a synthetic characterization of the structural
properties of networks. We ﬁrst compute the density of the network as follows :
ˆ η(g) = η(g)/n. (3)
This indicator hence corresponds to the average degree in the network. We also compute the






j￿=i d(i,j) × 1{i ↔g j ￿= ∅}
#{ij |i ￿= j,i ↔g j ￿= ∅}
, (4)
with #{·} denoting the cardinal of the set deﬁned into brackets and 1{·}, the indicator function
that is equal to unity if the condition is veriﬁed and zero otherwise. The average clustering
(or average cliquishness as it is often referred to in Physics) indicates the extent to which








1{j,l ∈ Ni(g);j ￿= l;j ∈ Nl(g)}
#{lj |j ￿= l;j,l ∈ Ni(g)}
. (5)
It is the frequency with which agents’ neighbors are also neighbors together.
6See Carayol and Roux (2003) for more precise time series analysis of the network formation process.
7The last two indicators presented above are aﬀected by the density of the network (the ﬁrst
indicator) that is likely to vary with δ. Therefore, these indicators are somehow biased and
we must ﬁnd an eﬃcient control for density. We propose to build, for each generated network,
control random graphs which have exactly the same number of agents and connections (thus
the same density). Such networks are simply built by allocating the given number of edges to
randomly chosen pairs of agents (Erdös and Rény, 1960). For each given number of edges and
agents, the four above mentioned indicators are then numerically computed for 1,000 of such
randomly drawn networks. The average of the observations is used as the control value. For







is the average clustering of neighborhood sizes over a set of 1,000
random networks that have exactly the same density as g (#grd = #g). Each of the indicators
is corrected using the corresponding ratio. This method allows us to analyze the structural
properties of networks for the diﬀerent values of δ while controlling for their density.
4.3 Results : When do small worlds emerge?
Let ﬁrst examine how the network density ˆ η(g) is aﬀected by δ. As shown in Figure 1,
the density is null when δ ≤ c = 0.1 : the process converges to the empty graph which is
pairwise stable for such values of the parameters (see Proposition 2). However when δ becomes
close to 0.1, some non empty networks begin to be selected. These networks are somehow in
a phase transition between the empty graph and networks for which agents have in average
two connections (density equal to unity). This conﬁguration appears to be mostly selected for
0.1 ≤ δ ≤ 0.2. The density of the network then increases up to nearly ˆ η(g) = 3 for δ ≈ 0.55.



















Figure 1. Network density ˆ η(g) when δ ∈ ]0;1[.
Behind the dots of Figure 1, one can ﬁnd networks with many diﬀerent structures. This
diversity calls for a rigorous statistical analysis of the structural properties of emergent networks.
8Before performing such a task, we provide in Figure 2 some intuitions on the typical networks
shapes obtained for several values of the parameter δ. When 0.09 ￿ δ ≤ 0.2, it is the ring
g◦ which emerges most often. So agents not only have two neighbors in average, but all are
connected to their two closest geographic neighbors. Numerical computations from Proposition
2 show that the ring is indeed pairwise stable when δ ∈ [0.0909,0.2] ∪ [0.975,0.998]. When
δ is equal to 0.3, networks in which all agents are connected to their four closest geographic
neighbors are likely to emerge. Such situation corresponds to the double geographic ring g2◦. At
the other far end of the spectrum, the networks tend to become maximal chains (gmc). When δ
approches unity, direct and indirect connections are likely to provide the same wealth, and thus
overlapping connections become redundant. Within these two extremes, when 0.35 ≤ δ ≤ 0.7,
we ﬁnd structurally distinguishable conﬁgurations characterized by the conjunction of : i) a
prevalence of local connections, ii) the existence of some “short cuts”. Such typical structure
























































































































Figure 2. Limit typical stable networks selected by the stochastic process in the simple
distributed innovation model. These networks have been obtained as follows : (top) δ = 0.15,
δ = 0.3, δ = 0.35; (bottom) δ = 0.7, δ = 0.98. The last network has been generated with the
simple connections model of Jackson and Wolinski (1996) with δ = 0.7 and c = 0.5.




>> 1 and d(g)/d
￿
grd￿
≈ 1. In words, a small world is a network which is
both highly clustered and the average distance of which is close to the one of random graphs of
the same density. Random networks are taken as points of comparison because they are known to
exhibit very low average path length. These ratios are plotted in Figure 3. From there it appears
that the average distance of emerging networks becomes close to unity when δ reaches 0.35, and
then stays on this value until δ ≈ 0.9. The average clustering ratio also decreases quite sharply
with δ > 0.2. Nevertheless, the clustering of emergent networks remains signiﬁcantly higher than
their corresponding random networks, at least until δ < 0.7. Therefore, we can conclude that
the small world conﬁgurations is observed for the whole region characterized by δ ∈ [0.35,0.7].
9Unsurprisingly, the relational network both correlates with the geographic metrics (clustering is














Figure 3. Average distance and average clustering when δ ∈ ]0;1[.
5. Proofs
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
i) The proof uses the following steps. We give an upper bound expression for the connected
network value of k links. We show that this expression is at its maximum when k = n−1 links.
Next, we show that under the given condition, that expression is negative. Since the value of
the empty graph is zero, it is the eﬃcient network under the condition.
An upper bound value of a network of k > n − 1 links may be given by :
πmax(g|#g = k) = 2kδ + [1/2n(n − 1) − k]δ2 − 2kc
This expression considers that all agents that are not directly connected, beneﬁt from each other
just as they were at relational distance 2. It also assumes that bonds costs are minimal (as it
is connecting immediate geographic neighbors). Now assume that k = n − 1. Thus the upper
bound network value becomes :
πmax(g|#g = n − 1) = 2(n − 1)
￿
δ + 1/2nδ2 − 2c
￿
(A1)
To know whether we should consider cases where k > n−1, let us see how the upper expression
of the network value behaves when we add a link : The maximal value with k (k > n − 1) links
minus the max value with k + 1 links is equal to :
πmax(g|#g = k + 1) − πmax(g|#g = k) = 2δ − δ2 − 2c
10which is independent of k and strictly negative when c > δ. Thus there is no interest in adding
a new link from the beginning that is from k = n − 1.
On the other hand if k < n−1, the network is not connected, then no node can beneﬁt from
all others. For instance if k = n − 2, then the agents are associated to at least two connected
components. Since the two components are isolated, the total value of the graph is equal to the
sum of the value of the two components. Let us assume that it is possible to connect the two
components by adding a bond at distance 1 (as it is assumed in the πmax expression). Then the
value of this bond adds to the total value more than any of the other ones did previously while
it costs at most the same. Thus the value of the graph with n − 2 links is negative if the one of
the connected graph composed of n − 1 links is also negative.
Thus expression (A1) gives the maximal value of the network. It is negative when : c >
δ +
(n−2)
4 δ2. This completes the proof.￿
Part ii) Any non empty acyclic graph is a tree or a set of disjoint trees (with potentially
some isolated agents). A tree of m nodes has always k = m−1 links. A tree of m+u−1 nodes
generates more utility than a graph composed of two distinct trees of m and u nodes, that is
because with the same number of links, it generates one more direct and several more indirect
connections. Thus we can restrict our analysis to connected acyclic graphs which are necessarily
trees.
One can get two diﬀerent types of trees given the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3. A network g is said to exhibit regional overlap if ∃i ∈ N(g) such that for an
arc jh ∈ g,i ∈ N(gcc), with gcc the covering chain of g.
a) Let us ﬁrst consider the trees for which there is no regional overlap.
In that situation, any link ij in g generates a cost equal to its covering chain (Deﬁnition
3) while it generates less utility since less agents are thus directly or indirectly connected. This
applied for all bonds that exhibit no regional overlap. Thus the value of such network is always
below the one of its associated covering chain.
b) Consider now connected trees which exhibit some regional overlap. In that situation, each
link ij of g such that d￿(i,j) generates an extra cost of 2c as compared to its covering chain, while
it generates at most a gross extra value of 2δ2 − 2δn−1. Thus π(g) < π(gc) if c > δ2 − δn−1.￿
Part iii) The proof of the ﬁrst part of the Proposition is trivial since gc costs as much as
gc￿ and gc￿￿, while it brings more utility due to more indirect connections. As regard, each new
node added to the chain costs as much as the preceding ones while it always brings more value
due to more indirect connections. Thus, if the maximal chain gmc has a positive value, then it
is always the most eﬃcient chain.￿
5.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Some part of the Proofs need the following deﬁnition.
11Deﬁnition 4. A network structure g is said to be payoﬀ-regular, iﬀ ∀i ∈ N : πi (g) =
π(g)/n.





Part i) When δ > c, the proof is trivial : two geographic neighbors always have interest
in forming a connection. When δ < c, it is easy to show that the empty network is always
stable. Being on the empty net, no agent has any interest in forming a link even with his direct
-geographic- neighbors since this connection will cost him always more than the (direct) gross
payoﬀ it may bring to him. Moreover, as showed by Jackson and Wolinski (1996), in such a
situation, stability implies no loose end, that is no agent i is connected to only one other agent
j. That is because j will always ﬁnd interest in severing this connection. Thus, as noticed by
Johnson and Gilles (2000), since all acyclic networks but the empty graph always have loose
ends (among which the star net), the empty network is the only acyclic pairwise stable network.
Part ii) In such a situation, the center of the star is never interested in maintaining a link
with his most distant neighbor. If n is even, he is at distance n/2. Thus, this link costs him
cn/2. If c ≥ 2/n, then this connection costs to the center star at least (2/n)(n/2) = 1, which is
more than his gross utility which is simply δ < 1. Same reasoning applies when n is odd, with
c ≥ 2/(n − 1).
Part iii) Since the ring is a structure that is payoﬀ-regular (Deﬁnition 4) we can restrict our
attention to any one agent to account for its stability.
If one agent i severs a link, he will then be at the far end of a maximal chain gmc = g
◦
−ij.



















Thus, no agent will have an incentive to sever a link if c > (1 − δn/2)
￿i=n/2−1
i=1 δi.
If one agent adds a new link to the ring, the extra costs will varies with the geographical
distance between him and his new neighbor say j. Assume n is even and let x be that distance




































if x is even.














































if x is even.
The proposition follows. ￿
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